In article <m9sps35fs4r4eg44ff2qvon06v5hmj306v@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>,
Alan Woodford <alanw@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>On 3 Mar 2008 20:47:11 -0500, "Keith F. Lynch" <kfl@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>wrote:
>
>>John Dallman <jgd@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>>> One campaign that was not fought, but would have been very bloody
>>> indeed, was the invasion of Japan. That could have got into WWI
>>> levels of deaths rather readily.
>>
>>Instead of an invasion, why not just blockade the islands so as to
>>starve them into submission?
>
>Because it wouldn't have worked.
>
>As recently as September 2007, there was evidence of high intensity
>agriculture on every available plot of land in Japan.
>
>A blockade would have made life uncomfortable, but I suspect if it had
>been tried, it would still be in place now!
Well, ...
Among the Japanese blunders were making no effort to improve
anti-submarine tactics and equipment during the war, and generally not
trying to protect or co-ordinate shipping. The US sub force
devastated the Japanese merchant marine and navy. By the time of the
surrender, Japanese home waters didn't have a substantial number of
large freighters in service.
<http://www.iias.nl/nl/38/IIAS_NL38_15.pdf>
is "Militarization of
nutrition in wartime Japan" by Katarzyna J. Cwiertka.
However, as the war progressed, nutritional advice for civilians
inevitably shifted towards relief food. The severe food shortage
was caused by the disruption of food imports from the colonies, on
which the home islands were heavily dependent, and the build-up of
manpower for the Japanese army and navy. As provisioning the
troops was considered the priority, the home front had to make do
with what was left. For example, between 1940/41 and 1944/45, the
amount of rice supplied to the armed forces rose from 161 to 744
thousand tons, making it impossible to retain rationing standards
for civilians (Johnston 1953:152). ...
Food shortages remained a major problem in Japan after 1945
despite US food relief programmes. On the top of millions of
hungry Japanese in the homeland, over six million military men and
civilians who were by 1948 repatriated from the colonies and
occupied territories had to be fed. This situation led to several
hundred victims of starvation and widespread malnutrition during
the second half of the 1940s (Dower 1999:54, 89-97).
But
<http://books.google.com/books?id=AyeqDTmM7BIC&pg=PA367&lpg=PA367&dq=japan+%22food+imports%22+1940&source=web&ots=T6we3apyK-&sig=ZsZamQP_oZzszzCfgih-a_n1BWM&hl=en>
is _Naval Blockades in Peace and War: An Economic History Since 1750_
by Lance Edwin. He says
Over the decade 1931-1940, imports of basic food accounted for
just less than one-fifth of Japanese consumption. In 1941 the
figure was 20.3 percent.
The real strangulation in the blockade of Japan was, well, everything.
P. 368 of Edwin lists the bulk imports. Oil isn't listed on that
table, but it was crucial, and tankers were a really big priority of
the US. In 1940, coal was big (7 MT), exceeded slightly by iron ore
and scrap iron (8 MT). Salt, 1.7 MT! Rice and paddy [?]: 1.7 MT.
That was about 19 MT out of 22 MT in 1940, but some of the others,
though small, were probably important too, like raw rubber and
bauxite.
<http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/8141/downfall.html>,
"Operation Downfall: The Invasion of Japan, November, 1945",
appears to be quoting without quotation marks from "An Invasion not
found in the history books" by James Martin Davis, The Omaha World
Herald, November, 1987.
During the summer of 1945, America had little time to prepare for
such an endeavor, but top military leaders were in almost
unanimous agreement that an invasion was necessary.
While a naval blockade and strategic bombing of Japan was
considered to be useful, MacArthur, for instance, did not believe
a blockade would bring about an unconditional surrender. The
advocates for invasion agreed that while a naval blockade chokes,
it does not kill; and though strategic bombing might destroy
cities, it leaves whole armies intact.
But I wonder whether that may be too pessimistic about the effects of
blockade. With no significant oil production in Japan, how would the
planes and tanks move? How would armies be supplied with the supplies
that they guzzle, even on the defensive, and how could the supplies be
manufactured anyway?
--
Tim McDaniel, tmcd@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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