Re: I've seen things you people wouldn't believe...

In article <h86624pvb6vb0p1p527tksk5e7h5h52g8b@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>,
 "David V. Loewe, Jr" <daveloewe@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:

> On Thu, 8 May 2008 07:27:37 -0700 (PDT), petertrei@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 wrote:
> 
> >On May 8, 12:00 am, "Keith F. Lynch" <k...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> >> David V. Loewe, Jr <davelo...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> >> > "Keith F. Lynch" <k...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> 
> >> >> If you're using good quality encryption, they may still be able to
> >> >> tap it, but that doesn't mean they can tell what's being said.
> 
> >> > If they REALLY want to know, they'll let the NSA play with it.
> >> > And they'll find out.
> >>
> >> I doubt that very much.  Computer power helps code-makers far more
> >> than code-breakers.
> >>
> >> > Trust me on this.
> >>
> >> Why?  Do you have inside knowledge?  If so, how come you're allowed
> >> to post about it?
> >
> >Absent good reasons, I'm not going to trust David on this.
> >
> >I have to agree with Keith here - while there is a heck of a lot of
> >lousy
> >security out there, I've never seen any evidence that the NSA (or
> >anyone
> >else) can break properly used modern crypto of adequate key length.
> >Breaches that do occur are due to poorly handled keys, poorly
> >implemented
> >software, or compromised systems. Doing it right is like maintaining
> >sterility in a medical operating field - a royal PITA, except you
> >won't know when you've failed until too late.
> >
> >FWIW, I recently finished a 10-year stint as an engineer at
> >RSA Security Inc, implementing and deploying cryptgraphic software,
> >so this subject is familiar to me.
> 
> 1) How much computing power does the NSA have at it's disposal?
> 
> 2) You do understand that Keith is talking about real time encryption
> of telephone conversations, correct?
> 
> 3) In light of 2), how many people have the capability of encrypting
> their phone *conversations*?  And who can they talk to?

Your final point is an important one. But it doesn't provide any support 
at all for your original claim. If you are now conceding that the NSA 
can't crack good quality enryption, then you ought to concede that your 
claim was wrong before substituting a new and more defensible 
alternative.

-- 
 http://www.daviddfriedman.com/
http://daviddfriedman.blogspot.com/
 Author of _Harald_, a fantasy without magic.
 Published by Baen, paperback in bookstores now