Re: I've seen things you people wouldn't believe...

In article <50j624th1j7pbo9uee1seu8cq11tssqmeq@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>,
 "David V. Loewe, Jr" <daveloewe@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:

> On Thu, 08 May 2008 09:44:51 -0700, David Friedman
> <ddfr@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> 
> > "David V. Loewe, Jr" <daveloewe@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> >> On Thu, 8 May 2008 07:27:37 -0700 (PDT), petertrei@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 wrote:
> >> >On May 8, 12:00 am, "Keith F. Lynch" <k...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> >> >> David V. Loewe, Jr <davelo...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> >> >> > "Keith F. Lynch" <k...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> >> 
> >> >> >> If you're using good quality encryption, they may still be able
to
> >> >> >> tap it, but that doesn't mean they can tell what's being said.
> >> 
> >> >> > If they REALLY want to know, they'll let the NSA play with it.
> >> >> > And they'll find out.
> >> >>
> >> >> I doubt that very much.  Computer power helps code-makers far more
> >> >> than code-breakers.
> >> >>
> >> >> > Trust me on this.
> >> >>
> >> >> Why?  Do you have inside knowledge?  If so, how come you're
allowed
> >> >> to post about it?
> >> >
> >> >Absent good reasons, I'm not going to trust David on this.
> >> >
> >> >I have to agree with Keith here - while there is a heck of a lot of
> >> >lousy security out there, I've never seen any evidence that the NSA
(or
> >> >anyone else) can break properly used modern crypto of adequate key
length.
> >> >Breaches that do occur are due to poorly handled keys, poorly
> >> >implemented
> >> >software, or compromised systems. Doing it right is like maintaining
> >> >sterility in a medical operating field - a royal PITA, except you
> >> >won't know when you've failed until too late.
> >> >
> >> >FWIW, I recently finished a 10-year stint as an engineer at
> >> >RSA Security Inc, implementing and deploying cryptgraphic software,
> >> >so this subject is familiar to me.
> >> 
> >> 1) How much computing power does the NSA have at it's disposal?
> >> 
> >> 2) You do understand that Keith is talking about real time encryption
> >> of telephone conversations, correct?
> >> 
> >> 3) In light of 2), how many people have the capability of encrypting
> >> their phone *conversations*?  And who can they talk to?
> >
> >Your final point is an important one. But it doesn't provide any
support 
> >at all for your original claim. If you are now conceding that the NSA 
> >can't crack good quality enryption, then you ought to concede that your

> >claim was wrong before substituting a new and more defensible 
> >alternative.
> 
> ?
> 
> Are you saying that the second point doesn't matter?

No. I skipped that because I'm not certain whether current encryption 
software can do real time encryption of conversation with adequate key 
length. My guess is that it can­the clipper chip flap was some time 
back, and pretty clearly at that time the NSA was concerned about the 
possibility­but I don't actually know.

-- 
 http://www.daviddfriedman.com/
http://daviddfriedman.blogspot.com/
 Author of _Harald_, a fantasy without magic.
 Published by Baen, paperback in bookstores now