In article <1211226389@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>, Wayne Throop <throopw@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>:: Here you seem to be speaking of divergence between two instances of
>:: the same person, as they ac***ulate different experiences. That's an
>:: obvious phenomenon, but it doesn't seem to speak to the question of
>:: whether they both are equally "really" the initial instance, plus
>:: some aging, or whether only one of them can legitimately claim that
>:: title.
>
>: mchary@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
(Michael Alan Chary)
>: Okay, why *would* they be the same?
>
>Um. Because it's a given of the hypothetical?
Um. No, because they can never be the same given the hypothetical. At a
minimum, they are standing a few feet apart.
>
>AIUI, they have identical physical structure
>(assuming translation invariance) to start with.
>So if either one of them says "I am Samantha", they have
>the same justification for that claim; neither really has
>a better, physically justifiable rationale.
>
>( Well... ignoring the Marat insistance on saying "I am called Samantha".
)
>
>The question (aiui) is whether the history of the physical
>constituents of prospective Samantha-candidates count, or only
>the current structure. In physics (and/or physicalism), the
>answer seems to be, no. Because fundamentally at the lowest
>level, particles don't keep rack of history. All that matters is
>their current state. ( Yeah, OK, quantum entanglement, but that's
>part of "their current state", not really a history as such. )
>An electron is an electron is an electron.
>
But human beings are not simply constituted of their component particles.
They are also made of people's reactions to them. Humans are a social
animal, and the question only becomes a real question if we take that
into account, because it only matters which one is real if we have at
least one other person to react to them. Does it make a difference who
has the original particles? Aparently not if the duplicate is lucky
enough to deal with Bill or you, but for 98% of the time, hell yes.
>The odd part of this scenario is, if somebody *else* keeps track
>of all the histories, *should* that record be part of judging claims
>of Samanthahood? I suppose one could simply agree to one or the other.
>Saying they shouldn't seems in some ways more useful and/or consistent.
>Because otherwise your identity would depend on somebody else's records.
>I suppose it's the difference between being a physicist and a bureaucrat.
>
Well, how about if you murder Samantha. Upon being charged with the
crime, you reveal yourself to be Dr. Thaddeus Sivana, Soooooper Genius,
and you produce a duplicate of Samantha identical in every respect to the
Samantha *immediately* prior to the instant of death except that this
Samantha is made of particles taken from the atmosphere other Lexor. Do
you still face the chair?
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