Re: David Gerrold - War with the Cthorr

In article <g0skaj$sdh$1@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>,
mchary@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 (Michael Alan Chary) said:

> William December Starr <wdstarr@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>> mchary@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 (Michael Alan Chary) said:
>>
>>> I'm basing it on the fact that there is a psyche made up of
>>> experiences.  A copy on me wouldn't have the experience of being
>>> born from my mother's womb.
>>
>> In what way would it not have the exact same psyche and experiences
>> as you had as of the time of your data having been scanned?
>
> Well, in the sense of how other people react to it.

Agreed, but that would be part of the divergence that occurs after
the point in time I specified.

[ ... ]

>> Here you seem to be speaking of divergence between two instances
>> of the same person, as they ac***ulate different experiences.
>> That's an obvious phenomenon, but it doesn't seem to speak to the
>> question of whether they both are equally "really" the initial
>> instance, plus some aging, or whether only one of them can
>> legitimately claim that title.
>
> Okay, why *would* they be the same?

I'm not sure _when_ in the sequence you're asking about.  Fred's
mind-state is recorded at time T1.  Fred2 has that data poured into
him and is awakened at time T2.  Are you asking "What makes Fred2 at
T2 the same as Fred was at T1?", or "Are they still the same after
additional experiential time has passed for least one of them?"

Re the first question:

If the recording of the mind-state of Original Fred was perfect, and
the pouring of that recorded data into Fred2 was equally perfect,
then either (1) Fred2, when he starts existence, is the same person
as Original Fred was when the recording was made or (2) there's
something of O.F. missing from Fred2, because there was more to
O.F. than just his mind-state.  If (1), they're the same; if (2),
what is it that's missing?

It's a question at least as old as speculation about matter
transmitters (<--joke): is there reason to believe that there is an
additional element to a person's self, beyond his mind-state?

Re the second question: of course once the two Freds' experiences
diverge so will their selves, and "same" will no longer apply to them.
But change-over-time isn't (generally) held to destroy continuity of
identity -- you aren't the same as you were ten years ago, but you
nonetheless have the same identity as you-of-ten-years-ago -- so if
Fred and Fred2 were each, at one time in their existence, held to be
"really Fred," then they'd each retain that identity-status as they
changed over time.  Um, wouldn't they?

-- 
William December Starr <wdstarr@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>