In article <g0uq2c$rgo$1@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>,
mchary@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
(Michael Alan Chary) said:
> In article <g0t0tp$ki0$1@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>,
> William December Starr <wdstarr@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>
>> If "*immediately*" is taken literally -- meaning, I suppose, that
>> only single Planck-Wheeler intervals pass between (a) "snapshot
>> of living Samantha is taken," (b) "Samantha is struck by effects
>> of weapon" and (c) "Samantha is dead," and then the snapshot from
>> (a) is used to reconstruct Samantha -- then _I_ would say that no
>> homicide has occurred[*1]. Various societies' legal systems may
>> feel otherwise, of course.
>
> Interesting theory. I invite you to argue it out with her family's
> estate lawyers depending on how wealthy she is.
Hmm. Now *there's* an on-commission case: take New Samantha's side
and if you win then she's legally the same person she always was and
can access her bank account and pay you; lose and she's a penniless
ward of the state and you get zilch. (Unless a judge makes new law
by declaring her an heir of legally-dead Samantha, anyway.)
> How about not immediately? How about a second? Two seconds? A
> minute? An hour? (Roger Zelazny's _Isle of the Dead_ used this
> sort of things as a plot point, actually.)
I can't give a specific answer. There are two categories of time
here: (1) intervals so short that zero or close-to-zero human
wet-brain cognition can take place in them, and therefore zero or
near-zero change can occur to my identity during that time; and (2)
longer intervals, during which I _do_ change, but "not very much."
In case (1) I'd have no problem -- no problem regarding continuity
of self, anyway -- with the idea of being stopped and then later
restarted. With regard to (2), I'd acknowledge that the me that
lived through those seconds, minutes, hours, days, was about to
cease to exist, but at the same time I'd feel pretty good about the
fact that something "close enough" to me would exist following the
restart. And no, I don't claim either (a) that's entirely rational
or (b) that "not very much" or "close enough" can be quantified.
When the interval is longer - weeks, or months, or years[*1], it
gets different. I'd still probably feel better about impending
non-existence knowing that something that once _was_ me would
survive me, but I admit that's really irrational.
*1: ObSF: the "beta" instance of the central character, Steward, in
Walter Jon Williams' VOICE OF THE WHIRLWIND, "resurrected" from
a backup copy when the original (the "alpha") died, and was
missing the last fifteen years of the dead man's life.
>> *1: _Other_ crimes or torts may have been committed with Samantha
>> as the victim, of course, and they may be ones that don't exist
>> yet in any real-world legal system because the cir***stances
>> have never arisen, but I don't think that she has been killed.
>
> Well, then for her there is no difference. Are you willing try it
> yourself should the occasion arise? (As Larry Niven once said,
> "I'm not going to ride in one of the damned things.")
As stated above, make it fast-acting enough that no experiential
part of me is lost and I'd be okay with it. Until/unless somebody
demonstrates that some other part of me -- the hypothetical soul --
is lost in the process anyway.
--
William December Starr <wdstarr@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
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